Institutionalization or interaction: Which organizational factors help community-based initiatives acquire government support? by Igalla, M. (Malika) et al.
OR I G I N A L A R T I C L E
Institutionalization or interaction: Which
organizational factors help community-based
initiatives acquire government support?
Malika Igalla | Jurian Edelenbos | Ingmar van Meerkerk
Department of Public Administration and
Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam,
Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural
Sciences, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Correspondence
Malika Igalla, Department of Public
Administration and Sociology, Erasmus
University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of








Increasingly, Western local governments are dealing with
community-based initiatives (CBIs) of citizens providing
public services. Municipalities possess critical resources
CBIs generally lack, including subsidies, buildings, and expo-
sure. There is still little knowledge on CBIs' factors for
government support. Therefore, this study adopts an orga-
nizational perspective distinguishing among institutionaliza-
tion (intraorganizational, e.g., organizational size and
democratic legitimacy) and interaction (interorganizational,
e.g., boundary spanning leadership [BSL]) factors for the
support CBIs obtain from local government. Analyzing large
N data (N = 2331) from CBIs in six countries by using struc-
tural equation modeling, we found that interaction factors
are related to more government support, whereas institu-
tionalization factors are less significant. More specifically,
we found stronger relationships for BSL and linking social
capital than for the factors related to the formalization and
development of organizational infrastructure, including the
much-discussed democratic legitimacy of CBIs, suggesting a
limited interest of governments in this topic as a factor for
support.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
With the shift toward the community in the public service delivery of various Western states, citizens increasingly
become active in community-led co-production projects and initiate community-based initiatives (CBIs). In these ini-
tiatives, the community provides the practical delivery of public services and goods, controlling the aims, means, and
implementation of activities (Bailey, 2012; Bovaird, 2007; Healey, 2015). Examples of CBIs derived from this study
concern community gardens in the Netherlands, neighborhood and property-fixing initiatives in the Unites States for
a safe and clean community, German CBIs supporting refugees with accommodation and integration in the commu-
nity, and initiatives aimed at development of the French youth with social, sports, and cultural activities. With such
CBIs, citizens provide a hands-on solution to various needs of their community, playing an important role in solving
local challenges, and they often have the ambition to form a durable cooperation (Healey, 2015; Igalla et al., 2019).
This sets CBIs apart from advocacy groups, citizens' panels, and formal citizens' initiatives, centered on influencing
political decision-making and public opinion.
In public administration, the shift toward the community does not only manifest in an increase in the number of
CBIs in local communities (e.g., Bailey, 2012; Hassink et al., 2016), but also in a growing interest of governments in
countries, like the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and the United Kigdom in community self-organization and co-
production as alternative ways to deliver services and goods in the public sphere (Bailey, 2012; Wagenaar &
Healey, 2015). Even though CBIs are a form of self-control (Arnstein, 1969) and are often informal by nature, they
do not take place in “splendid isolation” when trying to establish service delivery. CBIs work in institutionalized envi-
ronments; they encounter rules, laws, and procedures, especially from governmental organizations, and they usually
build relationships with other organizations (Bakker et al., 2012; Healey, 2015; Kleinhans, 2017), which is also the
case for the above examples in this study.
Though reliance on external resources can be associated with costs and dangers, such as a loss of autonomy
(e.g., Froelich, 1999), local governments still form major sources of support for CBIs. They possess critical resources
CBIs generally lack, such as subsidies, buildings, assistance with resource acquisition, help with rules and regulations,
and exposure (e.g., Bailey, 2012). Given that many CBIs are not (yet) financially self-sustaining, they often rely on
government funding (Bailey, 2012; Hassink et al., 2016). Institutional support can even be critical for the long-term
viability and performance of CBIs, making government support an important and significant subject to study
(e.g., Dale & Newman, 2010; Kleinhans, 2017).
In the public administration literature, there is an increased attention for the government support of CBIs
(Kleinhans, 2017), but we still lack clear understanding and insights into the factors of CBIs' obtainment of gov-
ernment support. This question has gained more attention in the field of the third sector and nonprofit organi-
zations, in which organizational theory has proven to be a valuable lens (Froelich, 1999; Lu, 2015; Stone
et al., 2001; Suárez, 2011). In their form and approach, CBIs are distinct from established and institutionalized
organizations that are part of the traditional third sector or nonprofit sector (e.g., Brandsen et al., 2017). For
instance, CBIs are citizen-led, more informal and voluntary-based (see also Appendix A for more information on
the characteristics of CBIs). However, both are part of the broader civil society and share characteristics, such
as their non-for-profit goals and relationships with government (Brandsen et al., 2017). Therefore, this study
makes also use of the broader nonprofit and third sector literature, while simultaneously discussing differences
with CBIs.
This article seeks to add to the literature on government-CBIs interactions, by integrating different literature
fields to test CBIs' organizational factors that are related to government support. We analyze an integral theoretical
model based on survey research among 2331 participants of CBIs collected from six countries with the use of struc-
tural equation modeling. Our research question is: “How do organizational factors explain the support CBIs get from
local government?”
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2 | THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
CBIs are defined as a form of self-organization in which citizens mobilize resources to collectively define and carry
out projects aimed at providing public goods or services for their community (Bakker et al., 2012; Healey, 2015). In
this study, CBIs are characterized by recurring and theoretically based core features: a (formal/informal) form of self-
organization, providing public services or goods to a community, being in control of internal decision-making, not-
for-private-profitmaking, mainly operating on voluntary work, and being community based (e.g., Bailey, 2012;
Healey, 2015). Although citizens control aims, means, and actual implementation of their activities, they often rely
on external resources, especially local government resources (Bailey, 2012; Bakker et al., 2012; Korosec &
Berman, 2006). Furthermore, CBIs usually operate in institutionalized settings with regulations at multiple scales and
therefore interact with government (e.g., Edelenbos & van Meerkerk, 2016; Healey, 2015). Therefore, in the public
administration and public management literature, CBIs are often conceptualized as a form of co-production or
co-creation (Kleinhans, 2017; Voorberg et al., 2015). Appendix A contains more elaboration on the characteristics of
CBIs (in our sample), also regarding their “membership of the family of co-production.”
2.1 | Defining government support
In this article, with government we refer specifically to local government, that is, municipal government, as CBIs with
their community orientation especially interact with local authorities. Building on CBI literature (e.g., Bailey, 2012;
Korosec & Berman, 2006), government support, assistance of CBIs by allocating for instance public staff, time, and
resources, can take on different forms and differs in magnitude.
Government funding (e.g., contracts and grants) is one form, which is often stressed in the literature on nonprofits
(e.g., Lu, 2015; Stone et al., 2001; Suárez, 2011). Even though CBIs have the ambition to be self-funding (e.g., through
membership subscription fees, commercial exploitation, and fund-raising activities) they usually depend (to some extent)
on government resources (e.g., start-up funds, subsidies, and contracts) as they have limited access to economic capital
(e.g., Bailey, 2012; Newman et al., 2008). Besides financial assistance, other types of support can be equally important
for CBIs. As CBIs operate in the public sphere, they often have to deal with legislation, such as health care and well-
being policies for care cooperatives. Access to information, and advice on how to cope with institutional structures of
government (divisions) for instance, can help prevent entanglement of CBIs in bureaucratic cobwebs (Healey, 2015;
Korosec & Berman, 2006). Furthermore, CBIs can benefit from an open and encouraging governmental environment
that enables assistance with exposure by raising awareness of their initiative, assistance with networking or enabling
support through active cooperation with the CBI to realize shared goals (Igalla et al., 2019; Korosec & Berman, 2006).
2.2 | Organizational factors to explain government support for CBIs
We use organizational theory to analyze what factors foster government support to CBIs. Specifically, we take insti-
tutional and resource dependence theory. Drawing upon these theories, we make a distinction between
intraorganizational and interorganizational factors (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), which we define as institutionaliza-
tion and interaction factors. We use these as explanatory frameworks to further conceptualize and examine the
relationships between organizational factors and government support.
2.2.1 | Institutionalization factors
For the first set of organizational factors, we build upon institutional theory. A basic idea of this theory is that organi-
zations gain legitimacy and support from their environment by adapting to professional norms, standard operating
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procedures, and other elements that form a social structure in the environment (Alexander, 2000; Helmig
et al., 2014; Zucker, 1987). Various studies tested the role of intraorganizational factors in nonprofits' obtainment of
government funding, including professionalization (e.g., Stone et al., 2001; Suárez, 2011). The literature stresses the
shift toward organizational professionalization and institutionalization in the nonprofit sector (e.g., Suárez, 2011),
which denotes an integration of routines, roles, rules, and specialized expertise that formalize and professionalize
nonprofits, and “embed them in the broader discourse of administrational organization” (Suárez, 2011, p. 310). In the field
of CBIs, which is characterized with a fundamental focus on being community-based, institutionalization seems to be at
least visible in the development of an organizational infrastructure (e.g., Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Igalla et al., 2019).
Organizational size
The first institutionalization factor we test is organizational size. CBIs' abilities to fulfill their mission, that is, organiza-
tional capacity, can be an important indication for providing government support. A central characteristic of organi-
zational capacity is human/member capacity or organizational size (e.g., Foster-Fishman et al., 2001).
The literature argues that larger community organizations are likely to be related with more government funding,
because they have a greater capacity to increase the scope of their services, geographically and programmatically
(Stone et al., 2001, p. 280). One way to measure this is by looking at the human capacity. In this regard, CBIs work
especially with volunteers (e.g., Bailey, 2012; Healey, 2015); having more volunteers, helps CBIs increase their capac-
ity to achieve desired outcomes. Furthermore, by showing their scope of volunteering residents committed to the
organization's goals by investing their time and energy, CBIs can enhance their legitimacy as providers of public ser-
vices. We therefore hypothesize the following:
H1. The organizational size, in terms of human capacity, is positively related to the level of government support of CBIs.
Formal organization
Oftentimes CBIs institutionalize themselves by establishing a formal organization, for instance to be taken more seri-
ously as a reliable actor by government; adopting a legal entity makes it easier to link with formal institutions
(Hassink et al., 2016). Moreover, a formal organization is often a requirement for institutional support (Van
Dam et al., 2014). Formality helps to create a stable and predictable structure and operating procedures (Foster-
Fishman et al., 2001; Lu, 2015). We expect a higher compatibility between formalized CBIs and governments, which
should enable government support:
H2. CBIs with a formal organization structure will obtain more government support.
Decision-making process: Operating as democratic legitimate
For governments, bureaucratic and political values such as transparency, equal treatment, openness, and accountability
are important goals to realize in their decision-making process and daily operations (e.g., Edelenbos & Van
Meerkerk, 2016). Therefore, in line with institutional theory, values related to democratic legitimacy also become
important to consider for (nonprofit) organizations seeking government resources (cf. Helmig et al., 2014; Lipsky &
Smith, 1989). The literature stresses the complex and normative nature of democratic legitimacy (cf. Bekkers &
Edwards, 2007). Without going in-depth into the democracy and legitimacy literature, which is not our intention here,
we define democratic legitimacy as a quality that tells us something about the degree in which the internal functioning,
that is, decision-making of CBIs has been recognized as justified. The latter can be assessed according to the common
distinction into input (focus on how input is being regulated equally), throughput (focus on how input is being
processed), and output (focus on how output serves communal needs) legitimacy (e.g., Bekkers & Edwards, 2007).
The literature has characterized the democratic legitimacy of CBIs, which are seen as an expression of direct participa-
tory democracy, as both an opportunity and challenge (cf. Geurtz & Van de Wijdeven, 2010; Wagenaar & Healey, 2015).
On the one hand, CBIs can be indicated as key driver of democracy. They are argued to promote more democratic
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governance forms, because of their ability to link policymaking and practical delivery much stronger than is common in par-
ticipation models in formal planning processes (Wagenaar & Healey, 2015, p. 557). They can offer arrangements for direct
interaction between citizens and between citizens and institutional representatives (Geurtz & Van de wijdeven, 2010).
However, as widely discussed in the literature, tension often arises when such an expression of direct participatory democ-
racy meets with the representative democracy in modern states (e.g., Geurtz & Van de wijdeven, 2010). Both understand-
ings of democracy show differences in their “internal logic, such as different types of accountability, different takes on
legitimacy, and different types of steering” (Geurtz & Van de wijdeven, 2010, p. 534), making it challenging to find a bal-
ance between them. This challenge forms also an argument for some of the critical voices in the literature to question CBIs
regarding matters of accountability, equality, and representation (e.g., whose concerns do they represent, how is account-
ability organized), especially when public resources are handled over to CBIs, which if often the case (cf. Uitermark, 2012;
Wagenaar & Healey, 2015). Citizen self-organization can become introverted and exclusionary (Healey, 2015, p. 117), and
it can create a divide among citizens and communities with and without self-organizing capacities (e.g., Uitermark, 2012).
Based on the above, we expect that CBIs who score low on democratic legitimacy will have trouble applying for
support. We therefore hypothesize the following:
H3. The democratic legitimacy of CBIs is positively associated with the level of government support.
2.2.2 | Interaction factors
For the second set of organizational factors, we build upon resource dependence theory. In this theory, organizations
are embedded in networks of interdependencies and social relationships (Froelich, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).
Acquiring and maintaining resources becomes of vital importance, but this task is not straightforward due to
resources being scarce and uncertain (Froelich, 1999). Organizations must engage with their environment (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 2003). We therefore investigate factors related to interaction with and management of the environment,
which help CBIs to coordinate their relationship with local government (cf. Alexander, 2000).
Linking social capital: Interorganizational ties that help to mobilize support
Interorganizational ties are important to deal with situations of interdependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). CBIs usu-
ally rely upon external ties to secure resources, such as buildings, grants, and information, as they generally have lim-
ited access to economic resources (e.g., Korosec & Berman, 2006; Newman et al., 2008). Interorganizational ties
allow the exchange of resources when goals are shared. This forms a basis in the literature on social capital, that is,
“features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pur-
sue shared objectives” (Putnam, 1995, pp. 664–665).
In the social capital literature, there is a point of general agreement, which is that better connected actors enjoy
higher advantages (Burt, 2000, p. 348). Social capital facilitates the mobilization of resources and the coordination of
action. It is generally conceptualized with the actor's social network as core element, which consists of ties that con-
nect the actor with other entities (Burt, 2000; Granovetter, 1973). Through strong and diverse ties in the network,
CBIs can get connected to actors with resources that help them realize their goals (cf. Burt, 2000; Newman
et al., 2008). Different types of ties exist. Because we are interested in the mobilization of government resources,
we focus on linking capacity (and not on bridging and bonding capacities).
Linking capital refers to ties of exchange between actors who know themselves to be unequal in their power and
access to resources (Szreter, 2002, p. 579). These ties in a CBI's social network, express the relationships between CBIs
and formal institutions, including government and funding agencies (Dale & Newman, 2010; Szreter, 2002). The ties
function as means of bringing new (government) resources and opportunities to the organization, which help improve
the implementation of activities (e.g., Alexander, 2000; Dale & Newman, 2010; Igalla et al., 2020).
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Such interorganizational linkages provide channels for communicating information to organizations on which the
focal organization depends (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 145). A civil servant is easily informed about the CBI's needs
for support when CBIs and civil servants keep interacting frequently. Moreover, interorganizational linkages have a
value for legitimating the focal organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Legitimate institutions represented in the net-
work of CBIs provide information to “…the world of the value and worth of the organization” (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 2003, p. 145), increasing a CBI's legitimacy and reputation with government authorities, and, thereby, the
likelihood of obtaining government support.
We therefore hypothesize the following:
H4. Strong linking social capital ties are positively associated with the level of government support of CBIs.
Boundary spanning leadership to manage interorganizational dependencies
Interorganizational relationships do not appear just out of thin air. Connecting and collaborative capacities are impor-
tant (for CBIs) to cultivate relationships with outside organizations, which can help in making a network of organiza-
tions and funding opportunities happen (e.g., Alexander, 2000; Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2018). Such capacities
are found in a specific (community) leadership style, that is, boundary spanning leadership (BSL; e.g., Van Meerkerk &
Edelenbos, 2018). Boundary spanning encompasses the activities and competences of (individuals within) organiza-
tions to cross organizational boundaries, thereby adapting to the environment and creating a better fit (Van
Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2018). A boundary spanning orientation helps to form and maintain interorganizational rela-
tionships, mobilize resources, and enhance legitimacy (e.g., Williams, 2002).
There are different types of boundary spanning competences and activities highlighted in the literature, includ-
ing the ability to understand the interests of people and organizations outside one's own circle (Williams, 2002). For
CBIs relevant boundary spanning activities are focused on “collecting relevant information, gaining resources, and
negotiating and coordinating with institutional players” (Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2018, p. 108). In this sense,
boundary spanning helps CBIs initiate institutional sensors that help them navigate through and connect with the
governmental system and generate support. We therefore hypothesize:
H5a. BSL is positively related to government support of CBIs.
Furthermore, boundary spanners play a necessary role in overcoming institutional logics—that is, different per-
spectives, interests, and rules between organizations—resulting in increasing mutual understanding, and realizing
strong linkages to institutional actors (Miller, 2008; Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2018, p. 145), thereby specifically
oriented at creating linking social capital. In this process of mutual understanding, having knowledge of what is
important for institutional actors, and devoting time to maintain contact with them, can help CBIs in connecting their
goals with policies and objectives of institutions, fostering the creation and strengthening of linking social capital
(Igalla et al., 2019). We therefore hypothesize the following:
H5b. BSL is positively associated with the strength of linking social capital of CBIs.
Moreover, we argue that CBIs with a strong boundary spanning orientation, will, consequently, invest more in
democratic legitimacy. Our argument lies especially in the advantages of connective capacities (which can be consid-
ered a specific boundary-spanning activity focused on interrelating actors) for democratic outcomes found in the
governance literature (e.g., Van Meerkerk et al., 2015). Connecting capacities enable boundary spanners to include
engaged actors and connect them to relevant processes. They bring people together, provide opportunities for actors
to engage and to deliver input (for decision-making), and have a feel for what is relevant for the different involved
actors (Van Meerkerk et al., 2015; Williams, 2002). Furthermore, a strong boundary spanning orientation is also char-
acterized by sharing and managing information (flows), which helps to connect relevant external developments to
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the internal organization (Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2018). Based on the above, BSL with its connective capacities
is important for enhancing the conditions of democratic legitimacy (Van Meerkerk et al., 2015). A strong boundary
spanning orientation empowers CBIs to deal with matters of input (e.g., opportunities for community members to
engage and provide input for new activities), throughput (e.g., the sharing of information about the initiative), and
output (e.g., its responsiveness to community needs) legitimacy (e.g., Miller, 2008;). We therefore hypothesize that:
H5c. BSL is positively related to the democratic legitimacy of CBIs' decision-making process.
Above, we have provided a theoretical argumentation for several associations that explain the level of govern-
ment support CBIs receive, using organizational factors building on institutional and resource dependence theory.
We summarize the hypothesized relationships in Figure 1, our conceptual model.
3 | METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Data collection and sample
We conducted a web-based survey among respondents participating in CBIs in six countries: the Netherlands, Ger-
many, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We included multiple countries in order to test
our conceptual model beyond a single country to increase the external validity of our results. Furthermore, we have
chosen Western developed countries that share a strong relationship to CBIs, historically and/or more recently with
the increase in (attention for) community initiatives (e.g., Bailey, 2012; Kleinhans, 2017; Wagenaar & Healey, 2015).
Data were collected in November and December 2016. A difficulty of the target population is that inclusive lists
of people participating in CBIs do not exist. Therefore, the sample was drawn from online panels managed by Kantar
Public (regarding the unit of analysis, the strategy was aimed at including one CBI participant per CBI). Kantar Public
is an integrated consulting and research agency that works across the world and aims to improve public policy, public
services, and public communication.
For the Netherlands, we included a screening to identify respondents participating in CBIs, trying to rule out respon-
dents active in other kinds of civic participation, such as formal political participation. People participating in the online
F IGURE 1 Conceptual model: CBIs' organizational factors for government support
Note: (+) = positive relationship. This conceptual model is a simplification of social reality with the purpose of
visualizing the relationships between the variables with the use of arrows. In theory, the variables could be causally
related, but this must be proved empirically with another research design. In this manuscript, we do not imply to
prove causality with our own empirical analyses
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panels were asked whether they are or were involved (in the last year) in a CBI, describing them as “activities that are
organized by people themselves with little or no involvement from the government.” For the other countries, the screen-
ing took place in the survey and not in the panels, because this was not possible for international data. However, we did
screen the data intensively in different ways to ensure their quality. A detailed elaboration on the selection and screening
process, including information on the representativeness of the data, can be found in Appendix A.
The total response for all countries is 2331 (see also Table 1). Specific examples of CBIs in our database include
for instance community associations delivering services for the elderly or people with disabilities; neighborhood
watches; initiatives focusing on maintaining greenery; initiatives aimed at realizing centers for seniors, and coopera-
tives for sustainable energy, such as solar energy. Appendix A shows a detailed elaboration on the characteristics of
the CBIs.
Regarding the respondents, we asked them about the average number of hours (per week) they participated in
the CBI to control whether more active respondents report more or less government support. The relationship is sig-
nificant, though weak (see also Results section), but suggests that less active participants could have underrated the
level of government support. To test whether passive members might indeed have been less equipped to answer
questions about our dependent variable, we also examined the role respondents have in the CBI (see also control
variables). Most respondents identified themselves as an active member, involved as a volunteer in a specific project
(45.47%), followed by passive or supporting members (34.19%), and board members (16.30%). No significant rela-
tionships were found between the role of respondents as a control and our dependent variable government support.
Furthermore, considering the questions about democratic legitimacy and BSL, the lack of predominance of respon-
dents in a leadership position reduces risks of overly positive self-reporting.
3.1.1 | Purpose of multicountry data set
In this article, we aim to test our theoretical model in different institutional contexts/environments. Our goal is to
find patterns across countries; however, we are not aiming for a theory-based comparison of countries. The latter is
an important next step for which this study provides future research directions. We therefore work with the com-
plete data set and only test whether the theoretical model holds in the different countries (see section structural
equivalence test).










Total data set 2331 53% 56.11 (13.54) University education (30.76%) Paid employment
(46.46%)




United Kingdom 372 59% 59.76 (11.73) University education (43.55%) Pension plan (40.32%)
United States 222 41% 61.95 (12.87) University education (70.72%) Paid employment
(40.54%)




France 461 46% 53.20 (12.68) University education (28.63%) Paid employment
(56.40%)
Sweden 217 51% 51.81 (15.11) University education (44.24%) Paid employment
(53.46%)
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3.2 | Measurement of variables
3.2.1 | Government support
We measured the level of perceived government support by building on the scales of Korosec and Berman (2006).
They distinguish three types of support that are highly interrelated and can therefore function together as a measure
for government support. Igalla et al. (2020) used several of their items and made them context-specific for CBIs,
resulting in a reliable scale consisting of 11 items (see Table 2), which we used in this article. The scale is a seven-
point scale,1 ranging from (1) “absolutely not” (agreeing with the statement presented in the item) to (7) “very
strongly” (agreeing with the specific item), with a not applicable category, which we recoded into missings. The latter
lead to the exclusion of 75 CBIs from the analyses, suggesting that 3.22% of the CBIs in our data do not obtain any
form of government support (in theory, this percentage can include respondents that could not adequately answer
the items about government support and therefore choose the not applicable answer category). Regarding the broad
operationalization of government support; this is suitable to the field of CBIs, because there are different ways in
which local governments can support CBIs, including financial help, assistance with coordination, information sharing,
and co-operation (e.g., Korosec & Berman, 2006), which this operationalization includes.
3.2.2 | Organization size
We measured organization size using human capacity of CBIs as indicator (cf. Foster-Fishman et al., 2001;
Healey, 2015). We asked respondents about the average number of volunteers and/or active members participating
in the CBI, using a six-point scale ranging from (1) “1–10 volunteers” to (6) “81 or more volunteers.” In the literature,
for instance on nonprofits, other operationalizations of organization size are used as well, including financial indica-
tors (e.g., Lu, 2015). We, however, choose for a human indicator, because we think this better fits the nature of CBIs
as citizen-driven, operating with especially volunteers, and having usually more access to human capital rather than
economic capital (e.g., Healey, 2015; Newman et al., 2008), thereby acknowledging the informal and smaller CBIs as
well. It is interesting, however, to include financial and/or output related indicators in a future operationalization of
CBIs' organization size, such as the total annual operating budget, and the volume of services, to check whether dif-
ferent types of indicators (human/financial/production) affect the results differently.
3.2.3 | Democratic legitimacy of decision-making process
Based on the literature, democratic legitimacy can be assessed using the well-known distinction in political science
between input, throughput, and output legitimacy (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007). Important aspects for input-legitimacy
are about opportunities for citizen participation, and the openness of the agenda-setting process. Throughput legiti-
macy refers to the quality, and transparency of the decision-making process, and output legitimacy is about the way
accountability is organized, and the responsiveness of decisions to the expressed concerns of citizens (Bekkers &
Edwards, 2007). We constructed six items based on these aspects to measure democratic legitimacy. Because the
aspects are especially designed to assess the democratic legitimacy of institutional governance practices, we trans-
lated the aspects into items that fit the context of CBIs. The items were measured using a seven-point scale ranging
from “totally disagree” (1) to “totally agree” (7). Furthermore, we acknowledge that we focus on the internal
decision-making and legitimacy mechanisms of CBIs, while the recognition of having a justified decision-making
could also depend on their (administrative) environment, for example, on the input from their environment and on
their accountability toward local government. A future operationalization of CBIs' democratic legitimacy should take
such external legitimacy mechanisms also into account.
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3.2.4 | Formal organization
Being formally organized is another identified factor that can affect the level of government support. Each country
can have its own set of legal entities for CBIs. We therefore worked with general legal forms that are often used by
CBIs and applicable in all six countries. We asked respondents about the formal organization of their initiatives using
a nominal variable (see Table 2 for the five categories) and recoded the options “other” and “I do not know” into
missings. The five categories were recoded into a dummy variable, comparing “no formal organization” (the reference
category) to “formal organization” (the four categories with formal entities).
3.2.5 | Linking social capital
We measured linking social capital by asking respondents to score the frequency of interaction with actors that are
identified as institutional parties in the literature, and which are often linked to CBIs—see Table 2 for the actors
(cf. Dale & Newman, 2010; Szreter, 2002). With this approach, we measure the strength of linking ties in an actor's net-
work, which is common in research about social capital (cf. Burt, 2000; Granovetter, 1973). We used a seven-point scale
to measure the frequency of interaction with each actor using the following scores: (0) never, (1) less than once per
year, (2) once per year, (3) every few months, (4) every few weeks, (5) weekly, and (6) daily. Thereafter, we made an
index score (ranging from 0 to 42) showing the sum of the interaction frequency with institutional actors in the network
of CBIs. While this operationalization method is common in the (quantitative) literature to measure (linking) social capi-
tal, it does however not fully capture the complexity of the relationships CBIs maintain with institutions, which is a limi-
tation of this study. We acknowledge that tie strength has different other dimensions to consider, just like social capital
has more elements besides the social connections, including qualitative and cognitive elements that point to aspects of
values, norms, trust and attitudes, such as the character of the interactions, the emotional intensity, and mutual confid-
ing of the actors engaged (e.g., Granovetter, 1973; Putnam, 1995). Nevertheless, interaction frequency does offer a the-
oretically and an empirically tested instrument to measure a network's worth and relate this to different
outcomes, including access to resources (cf. Burt, 2000; Granovetter, 1973), which corresponds with our research goal.
3.2.6 | Boundary spanning leadership
We used a previously tested scale to measure BSL (Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2018), and made the items context-
specific for CBIs (see Table 2 for the items). The items were measured with a seven-point scale ranging from
(1) “absolutely not” to (7) “very strongly.” With this scale, we measure activities that are related to an external per-
spective on BSL, that is, about connecting the CBI to actors and processes outside the CBI. In the literature, how-
ever, one can find other forms of measurement for BSL (see Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2018). With our approach,
we specifically aim to understand how an externally oriented management style is related to government support,
that is, external support. This operationalization also helps avoiding a possible overlap with the activities of demo-
cratic legitimacy, which have an internal focus.
Table 2 shows the specific items of the scales, their factor loadings, and the construct reliability and validity measures.
3.3 | Data analysis
To test our hypotheses, we use structural equation modeling (SEM) with Amos, Version 24 and follow the two-step
modeling approach introduced by Anderson and Gerbing (1988), creating a measurement and a structural model. See
Appendix A for an elaboration on our data analysis approach.
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Government support (GS) (N = 2256)
The municipality… 0.67 0.96/0.96
(1) provides financial assistance to the initiative
(such as subsidies)
0.673 GS – DL: 0.09
(2) supports the initiative in obtaining extra
resources (e.g., acquisition, submitting
applications for subsidies, fundraising)
0.797 GS – BSL: 0.22
(3) helps the initiative by providing availability to
real estate (buildings) or land
0.679
(4) gives the initiative the opportunity to execute
assignments (e.g., waste collection,
maintenance of public green spaces, etc.)
0.743
(5) supports the initiative through the provision
of information
0.866
(6) contributes toward initiative awareness 0.873
(7) assists in the coordination with other involved
parties
0.887
(8) encourages collaboration between those
parties with an interest in the initiative
0.867
(9) provides the initiative with advice, if required 0.854
(10) actively cooperates with the initiative 0.897
(11) participates in the initiative by taking
responsibility for certain tasks
0.838
Boundary spanning leadership (BSL)
The board of the initiative… 0.71 0.93/0.93
(1) involves people from outside the organization
when making decisions
0.787 BSL – DL: 0.34
(2) works closely with others (outside the
organization) to achieve results
0.872
(3) aims to link external developments (new
opportunities, possibilities, etc.) to the citizen
initiative
0.847
(4) devotes a lot of time to maintaining contact
with parties outside the organization
0.868




Output legitimacy 0.67 0.93/0.93
The board of the initiative…
(1) is accountable to its members/volunteers 0.793
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3.4 | Reliability and validity
The measurement model has been examined for convergent and discriminant validity based on the confirmatory fac-
tor analyses (CFAs). For the sample, all factor loadings are ≥0.67 and most go beyond 0.80, which is a first indicator
to demonstrate convergent validity (Hair et al., 2014). A second indicator is the average variance extracted (AVE),
which is for all variables higher than the threshold of 0.50 (see Table 2). Comparing the shared variance (squared cor-
relation estimate) between each pair of constructs against the AVEs for these two constructs, we found that the
AVEs of all constructs are larger than the corresponding shared variance, providing evidence for discriminant validity
(Hair et al., 2014). Regarding reliability, the Cronbach alpha and composite reliability values of all constructs exceed













(3) have the ability to influence the direction of
the initiative
0.812
(4) have, in principle, an equal opportunity to




(5) has a clear system for making decisions 0.847
(6) provides information to members/volunteers




How many people (volunteers and/or active
members) are active in the grassroots
initiative (scale 1–6, with (1) 1–10, (2)11–20,
(3) 21–40, (4) 41–60, (5) 61–80, (6) 81 or more)?
N/A N/A N/A
Linking social capital (N = 2330)
Generally speaking, how often is the citizen initiative
in contact with the following parties? This contact
can take various forms, for example, working
together, performing a financial consultation and/or
receiving advice.
N/A N/A N/A
Central government, province (county), municipality:
local council, municipality: municipal executive,
municipality: civil servants, funds/sponsors, housing
corporations
Formal organization (N = 2043)
How is the grassroots initiative organized? N/A N/A N/A
There is no formal organization, as an association, as a
foundation, as a cooperative, as a company (public
limited company or private company)
Note: If not mentioned otherwise in the table, N = 2331. All factor loadings are statistically significant: p < 0.001. See also
Appendix A for a description of the measures in the table.
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3.5 | Common method bias
We need to address common method bias (CMB)—an issue that appears when the estimated relationships between
constructs might be distorted—as our study was based on self-reported data obtained from the same source
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). We have given much attention to this issue, before and after data collection, and during data
analyses. We used for instance ex-ante procedural remedies for reducing the likelihood of CMB in the survey design,
and ex-post statistical controls for testing CMB. In Appendix A we give a detailed discussion of how we dealt
with CMB.
3.6 | Control variables
We selected control variables related to respondents, as personal attributes can be related to CBIs' mobilization successes
of government resources (e.g., Uitermark, 2012), and two more controls related to the organization of CBIs. First, we con-
trolled for age, gender, educational level, status of employment, and organizational background. We also controlled for the
role of the respondent in the initiative, distinguishing between being a member of the board (reference category), being an
active member, involved as a volunteer in a specific project, and being a passive member or volunteer (or “otherwise”
involved, recoded into missings). Moreover, we included the average number of hours (per week) the respondents partici-
pate in the CBIs. Second, regarding the CBIs, we included the sector in which the CBIs operate (16 sectors, including health
care, sustainable energy, education, and recreation), and the evolutionary phase of the initiative (five categories, with the
initial phase as reference category; see Appendix A for descriptives of the phases).
3.7 | Structural equivalence test
Though, as explained above, our goal is not focused on comparing the countries in our sample, we do want to exam-
ine to what extent our significant structural model has external validity for the countries within the database—that is,
we want to demonstrate structural equivalence of our final significant model across the countries in the sample (see
Results). Therefore, we performed a multiple-group analysis in Amos, Version 24 (cf. Byrne, 2010). See Appendix B
for more information about this method and for the results of the structural equivalence test. The results are further
discussed in the next section.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the means, SDs, and correlations for all model constructs and control variables. The (significant)
correlations with government support are positive for all model constructs and indicate that our expected rela-
tionships are likely to occur. Yet, the strength of the correlations is rather modest for most variables in the table
(especially regarding the relationships between the research concepts and the control variables), with the inter-
action factors showing stronger correlations than the institutionalization factors. These observations indicate
that a weak (or no) association can be expected concerning the institutionalization factors when performing the
SEM analyses. This is an interesting first observation that we will further test with the SEM analyses and discuss
in the following section.
Furthermore, the descriptive statistics for government support show that the average score for all items is 3.50
(SD = 1.54) on a seven-point scale, which is somewhat below the mid-range of the scale. The highest scoring is for
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Item 5, government support through the provision of information (M = 3.75, SD = 1.78) and the lowest scoring is for
Item 1, government support through financial assistance (M = 3.20, SD = 1.92). In Appendix A, we show the descrip-
tive information for all items. Based on these statistics, an interesting observation is that CBIs especially receive
“nonmaterial” forms of government support, such as advice and assistance with coordination and implementation,
whereas the “material” forms of government support, including financial assistance and providing availability to real
estate have lower average scores (see Appendix A). Regarding some other variables, democratic legitimacy has an
average of 5.04 on a seven-point scale, indicating a positive evaluation. Respondents score BSL (slightly) positive
with an average slightly above the mid-range of the scale.
4.2 | Hypothesis testing
Figure 2 presents the results of the hypothesis testing, that is, the outcomes of the significant structural equation
model, with information about the model fit.
4.2.1 | Relationships between institutionalization factors and government support
Impact of organization size on government support
In Hypothesis 1, we expected a positive relationship between the organization size and government support, which,
as Figure 2 shows, is not the case as a negative relationship is present. Larger CBIs in terms of human capacity (num-
ber of volunteers) are not related to having more government support.
F IGURE 2 Results of the structural equation model
Note: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001. The scores on all lines indicate the (direct) standardized regression coefficients
(beta coefficients) for the significant relationships. The significant control variables are not depicted for display reasons.
Function estimate means and intercepts used to deal with some missing values. The beta coefficients of the control
variables (in relation to government support) are: age of respondent: −0.08***; hours active: 0.05**; status of employment:
unpaid work outside own household: −0.04*; sector/goal: promoting social cohesion: −0.04*; sector/goal: establishing
infrastructure: −0.04*; sector/goal: caring for public spaces and planting greenery: 0.07***. R2 Government support: 0.29;
R2 Democratic legitimacy: 0.34; R2 Linking social capital: 0.16. The overall fit of the structural model was tested using the
following fit indices: CMIN/DF, the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), PCLOSE, and the comparative fit
index (CFI). Good model fit exists when CMIN/DF has a value between 1 and 3; RMSEA ≤0.5; PCLOSE ≥0.5; CFI ≥0.95
(Byrne, 2010). However, the sample size affects the value for CMIN/DF, and therefore a cut-off value as high as 5 can
indicate a reasonable fit (cf. Marsh & Hocevar, 1985). Overall, the fit to the data of both the significant structural equation
model (CMIN/DF: 4.84, RMSEA: 0.041, PCLOSE: 1.00 and CFI: 0.97) and the measurement model (CMIN/DF: 4.15,
RMSEA: 0.037, PCLOSE: 1.00 and CFI: 0.99) were good
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Impact of formalization on government support
In our second hypothesis, we expected that formalized CBIs have more government support than informal CBIs (without a
legal status). However, no significant differences in government support were found between formalized and informal CBIs.
Impact of a democratic legitimate decision-making process on government support
Regarding the democratic legitimacy of the decision-making process of CBIs, we expected in Hypothesis 3 a positive
relationship with government support. Based on Figure 2 this can be confirmed (cf. Lipsky & Smith, 1989). CBIs that
run their organization more democratically have more government support, though the relationship is weak.
4.2.2 | Relationships between interaction factors and government support
Impact of linking social capital on government support
The first interaction factor is linking social capital for which we expected a positive relationship with government
support in hypothesis 4. Figure 2 indeed presents a positive relationship; therefore, this hypothesis is confirmed.
Direct impact of BSL on government support
In Hypothesis 5a, we expected a positive relationship between BSL of CBIs and government support. Figure 2 con-
firms this hypothesis, which is in line with the literature (e.g., Igalla et al., 2020; Lu, 2015; Van Meerkerk &
Edelenbos, 2018).
Impact of BSL on linking social capital
The results in Figure 2 also confirm the positive expected relationship between BSL and linking social capital of CBIs,
showing the importance of BSL for building and strengthening government relationships (cf. Alexander, 2000; Igalla
et al., 2019).
Impact of BSL on democratic legitimacy of CBIs' decision-making
In our final Hypothesis, 5c, we expected that BSL is positively associated to the democratic legitimacy of CBIs'
decision-making process. As Figure 2 presents, there is indeed a positive (and strong) relationship, which confirms
the hypothesis.
4.2.3 | Controls
The notes under Figure 2 show the relationships between the significant controls and government support. A first
impression is that the personal and organizational attributes we distinguished are weakly or not related to CBIs'
mobilization successes of government resources. Though this research does not have the goal to test expectations
about unequal opportunities for self-organizing citizens to public resources, this finding at least seems to suggest
that such a consequence is less present in our sample. Yet, a few attributes are still significantly related to the acqui-
sition of government support. It seems that older CBIs' participants, and participants without paid work, tend to indi-
cate lower levels of support. Furthermore, CBIs that promote social cohesion or establish infrastructure, are related
to less government support—compared to CBIs that are not active in those sectors—whereas CBIs active in caring
for public spaces and planting greenery indicate higher levels of support—compared to those that are not active in
this area—though the relationships are weak. Moreover, the life cycle of CBIs does not relate to government support,
meaning, no significant differences in government support were found between CBIs in the initial, growing, mature,
upscaling, or finishing phase.
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4.2.4 | Results of the structural equivalence test
To test whether the model in Figure 2 is equivalent across the countries in the sample, we performed a multiple-group
analysis. Appendix B contains a description of the analysis and the outcomes. The results show that the significant struc-
tural model is not invariant across the countries, that is, the countries show differences regarding the relationships in
Figure 2. We can make a few interesting conclusions regarding these differences, that is, the validity of the tested model.
First, the countries in the sample differ on the relationship between democratic legitimacy and government support (only
significant for France), and the relationship between organization size and government support (only significant for Ger-
many). Furthermore, the countries show differences regarding the control variables, see Appendix B for the exact differ-
ences. On the other hand, the countries showed equivalence regarding the relationships between BSL and democratic
legitimacy, BSL and government support, BSL and linking social capital, and linking social capital and government support
(though the strength of the relationships differ, see Appendix B). Hence, for the interaction factors, our model has struc-
tural equivalence. We discuss these findings further in the next section.
5 | CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Before we discuss the conclusions of our research, we want to mention a few limitations of our study. First, we want
to underline that we did not prove causality in our study. We also cannot rule out the possibility of reversed causality
regarding the factors in relation to government support. To provide evidence on the causality, other research data
and research designs, such as studies that collect longitudinal data or employ an experimental design, are necessary.
Furthermore, we want to mention the limitation of our research regarding the social reality of the interactions
between CBIs and government. This reality is more complex than we (can) capture with our study, which is less
aimed at the qualitative nature of interactions (e.g., how government-CBIs' relationships came into being, and how
both actors perceive their relationships), and its association with government support. Keeping these limitations in
mind, we can draw several meaningful conclusions from our study.
The first conclusion is about the support CBIs in our sample obtained of local governments. By far, most CBIs
(at least 96.78%) receive one or more forms of government support with, on average, a rather moderate magnitude,
and of especially a “nonmaterial” nature. It is interesting to examine whether demand and supply of government sup-
port are in balance or that CBIs perhaps do need the “material” resources but are not getting them sufficiently. Espe-
cially in the latter case, a policy recommendation for local governments would be to inventory the different forms of
support they have available, which forms are wanted by the local CBIs, and which forms they actually give to the
CBIs, and make these data public. This helps in identifying the (dis)balances in desired and supplied government sup-
port. Furthermore, it enables empirical research into an important question in the current literature, how government
support affects the existence and performance of CBIs (cf. Igalla et al., 2019; Kleinhans, 2017).
To further develop the literature on government support, future research should use qualitative methods to
examine the nature, appreciation and preferred level(s) of the support (forms). In doing so, there should also be atten-
tion for possible negative effects of government support (forms), as it can come with a price tag, such as red tape
(Igalla et al., 2019). Moreover, as a counterpart of this study, future research should examine government's organiza-
tional factors for supporting CBIs. Finally, this study shows that a broad operationalization of government support
instead of a focus on financial support is more appropriate in research on CBIs (cf. Korosec & Berman, 2006).
The second conclusion is that interaction factors are positively related to the acquisition of government support.
Specifically, CBIs with stronger linking social capital and BSL are related to higher levels of government support, and
BSL is positively associated with linking social capital. In line with the social capital and community development lit-
erature, this confirms the importance of vertical ties for CBIs to mobilize and acquire government resources
(e.g., Dale & Newman, 2010). Furthermore, these findings confirm that CBIs' capacities to (further) connect the
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organization to external opportunities and (institutional) actors, like government officials, is of great importance for
the acquisition of government resources (Miller, 2008; Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2018).
Thirdly, institutionalization factors are hardly related to government support. Specifically, the formalization of
CBIs has no relationship with support—though the literature assumes a better fit between formalized CBIs and gov-
ernment (cf. Hassink et al., 2016; Van Dam et al., 2014)—larger CBIs are related to less support, and CBIs with a
stronger democratic decision-making process are associated with more government support, though this relationship
is weak.
The negative relationship between organization size and government support seems to contradict the literature
on the third sector in which a greater capacity has been related to more support. In this study, we approached gov-
ernment support more broadly, not only including funding aspects, but also coordination, information, and coopera-
tion aspects. This differs from the focus on funding in most studies on nonprofits (e.g., Lu, 2015; Suárez, 2011),
which could be an explanation for this difference. Furthermore, this study uses the number of volunteers as indicator
for organizational size, whereas other scholars, such as Stone et al. (2001), measured organization size of nonprofits
by using a financial indicator. However, Stone et al. (2001) did also find that nonprofits that use fewer volunteers are
more likely to receive a higher proportion of total revenues from government sources, which is in line with our study.
As we found the same negative relationship between number of volunteers and government support, it is interesting
to investigate whether the same impact of professionalization found in the third sector has inched into the field of
CBIs as well.
Regarding the decision-making process, it is striking that this factor has such minimal explanatory power for
government support. In our sample, CBIs do give quite the attention to the democratic functioning of their orga-
nizations, but it seems that in practice, governments do not consider this as an important factor for support.
Though more research is needed to confirm this finding, we would like to discuss this outcome further. One
explanation for this finding lies in the focus of CBIs under study, which is foremost on the practical delivery of
services and goods. It is conceivable that government officials give more attention to democracy issues in partici-
pation forms centered on influencing political decision-making and public opinion, such as citizens' panels. Fur-
thermore, governments themselves might not be that fascinated in the democratic outcomes CBIs might
produce. In fact, such innovative and alternative forms of democracy could challenge the representative model
upon which the government operates (e.g., Wagenaar & Healey, 2015). CBIs, whether deliberately or not, might
contribute to organizing alternative pathways to produce and deliver societal services that can challenge
established practices in the hierarchical top-down models of state delivery (Wagenaar & Healey, 2015). Never-
theless, our finding does have an important policy implication regarding CBIs that over time have developed
themselves into key local suppliers of specific public services, for instance because of government retreat in
areas, such as neighborhood regeneration. Democratic legitimacy is, then, an inevitable factor for local govern-
ments to consider when giving or continuing support. Future research should further examine the significance of
democratic legitimacy as factor for government support and explore how the democratic potential or democratic
danger of CBIs manifests empirically.
Our fourth conclusion is that BSL can function as a strategy for CBIs to enhance the democratic legitimacy of their
decision-making process. The relationship between both variables is the strongest one in this research. While we mea-
sured BSL from an external perspective, our results show that this leadership style has strong internal impact as well.
Community leaders who invest in connecting with the environment, including institutional parties, in collaboration activi-
ties, and in sharing and managing information about their initiatives, seem to be able to make their CBIs open places that
value connections and that are responsive to their members/volunteers. In other words, the above BSL-activities can help
CBIs in dealing with organizational matters of transparency, information sharing (throughput legitimacy), involvement of
community members (input legitimacy), and responsiveness to community needs (output legitimacy).
Our final conclusion concerns the differences in explanatory power between institutionalization and interaction
factors for government support. Comparing the findings on both types of factors, we conclude that interaction fac-
tors, stressing interorganizational aspects, have more explanatory power regarding differences in the level of
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government support among the CBIs in our sample. This conclusion is supported by the structural invariance test we
performed to examine to what extent our significant structural model has external validity for the different countries
in the sample. Since we found structural equivalence across the countries for the interaction factors only, we can
conclude that, regardless of country context, for the mobilization of government resources, building linking capital
and BSL seem to be more effective than institutionalizing the organization. Furthermore, as the equivalence test did
reveal country differences regarding institutionalization, conducting country comparative research would be an inter-
esting and relevant way forward (cf. Brandsen et al., 2017).
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ENDNOTE
1 We performed PCA with oblique rotation in SPSS 24 and CFA analyses in Amos version 24 for all latent variables. Results
showed clear one-component structures, meaning the scales for government support, BSL, and democratic legitimacy
responded to the scales used in literature.
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY: A FURTHER ELABORATION
Further elaboration on theoretically based characteristics CBIs in sample
Concerning the composition of the sample, we have used the recurring theoretically based core features of CBIs, as
discussed in the theoretical framework, based on a systematic literature review on CBIs (Igalla et al., 2019) to pre-
select and screen the CBIs in our sample. Before and during data collection, we have put effort in pre-selecting and
screening CBIs that share these same theoretical core features (e.g., through the specific pre-selection question and
examples we gave to potential respondents based on these features, and through the questions for potential respon-
dents about other types of participation, such as political participation, in order to rule those out). After data collec-
tion, we screened the data intensively, for some countries, this was also with help of native speaking colleagues, in
order to ensure that the CBIs in our sample all have the same theoretical core features. We will discuss these charac-
teristics we introduced in the theoretical framework below in more detail.
With CBIs we refer to nonprofit and bottom-up activities of citizens aimed at self-organizing public goods or ser-
vices for their community. They provide and maintain an alternative form of traditional governmental public services,
facilities, and/or goods themselves, such as education and training, work integration programs, and residential care
(Igalla et al., 2019). CBIs can be both informally and formally organized and differ in their legal structures. Whether
or not formally organized (we include both formalized and informal initiatives in our sample), citizens (and not
governmental nor private organizations/entrepreneurs) organize these activities themselves, but they are likely
to link to various public and private organizations for support, of which local government is an important institu-
tion they often interact with (see also Bailey, 2012; Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2016; Igalla et al., 2020). If for-
malized, the initiatives can differ in their organizational structure (e.g., being an association or a cooperative).
However, we have put effort to screen the initiatives in our sample so that they have the same theoretical char-
acteristics of:
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• Being a (formal/informal) form of self-organization, providing public services or goods to a community (so we do
not focus for instance on charities; ballot initiatives; dialogue and deliberation initiatives, such as citizen juries,
and political and policy groups or movements, including interest groups).
• Being in control of internal decision-making.
• Not-for-private-profitmaking, even though CBIs can use market-based approaches (e.g., investing in their own
revenue model) to increase financial stability.
• Mainly operating on voluntary work.
• Being community-based, meaning that local collectives of residents are the (current) driving force behind the ini-
tiatives, they focus on community needs, and they mobilize volunteers from the community (Bailey, 2012; Igalla
et al., 2019; Igalla et al., 2020).
These characteristics distinguish CBIs from activities of established and institutionalized organizations in the tradi-
tional third sector/nonprofit sector with paid workers and no or limited link to voluntary citizen self-organization and
participation (Brandsen et al., 2017; Igalla et al., 2020).
Furthermore, in the public administration and public management literature, CBIs are often conceptualized as a
form of co-production or co-creation (Kleinhans, 2017; Voorberg et al., 2015). The above characteristics of CBIs sets
them apart from regular/traditional co-production, where citizens are involved in the production process under (strict)
conditions and frameworks set by governments (cf. Arnstein, 1969; Voorberg et al., 2015). Instead, CBIs can be under-
stood as “a member of the family of co-production” (Voorberg et al., 2015). Some authors point at specific forms of co-
production in which the community has a more leading role; in this literature one speaks of community-led co-
production (e.g., Bovaird, 2007). Citizens are not “just” involved as co-designer or co-implementer in the production
processes under frameworks set by governments, but they initiate and lead whereas governments react and facilitate.
Descriptive statistics: Character of CBIs and their received government support
In our sample, we see that the CBIs are active in different sectors. Not surprisingly, most CBIs provide their services
in relation to social objectives. The three most common sectors (or objectives) in which the CBIs are (at least) active
are (promoting) liveability/quality of life (45.22%), (promoting) social cohesion (33.42%), and (promoting) wellbeing
(32.56%). The CBIs in our sample are much less focused on (generating/organizing) renewable energy (3.78%),
(increasing) entrepreneurship (3.86%), and (establishing) infrastructure (11.58%).
With regard to the organizational size of the CBIs, 69 percent of the CBIs have more than 10 volunteers. Fur-
thermore, in our sample, most CBIs do have a formal legal structure (1199 CBIs, corresponding with 51.44% of the
sample [sample contains here 2043 CBIs, with 288 missings]). Yet, there are still quite some CBIs that organize their
services informally (844 CBIs, corresponding with 36.21% of the sample). Regarding the life cycle or evolutionary
phases of the CBIs, we see that most CBIs are in a mature phase, being fully operational (1023 CBIs, 43.89%),
followed by the growing phase, indicating a status of development in which support is being mobilized as well as rec-
ognition by established parties (478 CBIs, 20.51%). The finishing phase is the third most common evolutionary phase,
meaning the CBIs have ended (372, 15.96%). Next, 338 CBIs (14.50%) can be found in an upscaling phase, referring
to activities, such as exploring new services. Finally, 120 CBIs (5.15%) are in an initial phase, being active in activities
like researching, preparing and experimenting.
Next, we compared the average scoring of the different items of government support to show which types of
support the CBIs receive the most. Though the differences between the different types of support are not very high
for some items, they do show an interesting pattern when compared, which is that the CBIs, on average, seem to get
more “nonmaterial” forms of government support than “material” forms (see also results and discussion sections).
The statistics, the scores on the items / forms of support, from high to low average scores are:
• Item 5, support through the provision of information (M = 3.75, SD = 1.78).
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• Item 9, support through advice, if required (M = 3.72; SD = 1.81).
• Item 8, support through encouragement of collaboration between those parties with an interest in the initiative
(M = 3.67; SD = 1.77).
• Item 6, support through contribution toward initiative awareness (M = 3.63; SD = 1.79).
• Item 10, support through actively cooperating with the initiative (M = 3.59; SD = 1.79).
• Item 7, support through assistance in the coordination with other involved parties (M = 3.48; SD = 1.77).
• Item 4, support through giving the initiative the opportunity to execute assignments (e.g., waste collection, main-
tenance of public green spaces, etc.) (M = 3.46; SD = 1.88).
• Item 3, support through providing availability to real estate (buildings) or land (M = 3.42; SD = 1.98).
• Item 11, support through participating in the initiative by taking responsibility for certain tasks (M = 3.30;
SD = 1.85).
• Item 2, support with obtaining extra resources (e.g., acquisition, submitting applications for subsidies, fundraising)
(M = 3.22; SD = 1.82).
• Item 1, support through providing financial assistance to the initiative (such as subsidies) (M = 3.20; SD = 1.92).
Data collection and screening process: A detailed elaboration
The data were collected in two rounds: for the Dutch respondents and for the international data. For the Nether-
lands, data were collected in November 2016 (from the 8th until the 16th of November, including one reminder on
the 14th of November), and for the other countries data were collected in December 2016 (from the 20th until the
29th of December, without reminders).
A difficulty of the target population is that inclusive lists of people participating in CBIs do not exist. Therefore,
the sample was drawn from online panels managed by Kantar Public (regarding the unit of analysis, the strategy was
aimed at including one CBI participant per CBI). Kantar Public is an integrated consulting and research agency that
works across the world and aims to improve public policy, public services and public communication.
For the Netherlands, this organization has a large reach of its online panel and representativeness, which con-
sists of 124,000 randomly selected respondents from different social-economic categories. We included a screening
to identify respondents participating in CBIs, trying to rule out respondents active in other kinds of civic participa-
tion, such as formal political participation, and activism (e.g., writing petitions). People participating in the online
panels were asked whether they are or were involved (in the last year) in a community-based initiative, describing
them as “activities that are organized by people themselves with little or no involvement from the government.” We
provided examples, like community-based activities focused on providing care facilities, caring for public spaces and
planting greenery, and starting community enterprises. If they did, then they were invited to complete the full ques-
tionnaire. From this screening a total of 1500 people were representatively (age, social class, education, gender, etc.)
selected to complete the full questionnaire. Of these respondents, a group of 797 respondents participated in the
research (response rate of 53.13%). After screening the data to ensure the quality of response and to ensure the
respondents were indeed participating in CBIs, a total of 671 respondents remained in the data set (adjusted
response rate of 44.73%). See Table 1 for the descriptive statistics of this group.
For the other countries, the screening took place in the survey and not in the panels, because this was not
possible for international data. However, we did screen the data in different ways to ensure their quality (see
below, Section A.4), as is explained in the main text. Although the research agency has sought to include a good
variance in background characteristics, we acknowledge that we cannot ensure representativeness for the inter-
national data. The response for each country was: United Kingdom (468), United States (368), Germany (604),
Sweden (365), and France (815). As we did for the Dutch data, we screened the international data on their qual-
ity and appropriateness, for which we involved native speaking scholars when necessary. This resulted in
adjusted sample sizes (see Table 1 in main text), excluding many politically and lobby-oriented initiatives,
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especially in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, which is also an important explanation for the
changes in sample sizes.
Common method bias
CMB is an issue that appears when the estimated relationship between constructs might be distorted, and, conse-
quently, can have the potential to jeopardize the validity and reliability of the research findings (Podsakoff
et al., 2003; Rodríguez-Ardura & Meseguer-Artola, 2020). As potential sources for CMB appear in studies with
single-source, self-report and/or cross-sectional designs (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Rodríguez-Ardura & Meseguer-
Artola, 2020), we have given much attention to this issue, both before and after data collection, as well as after data
analyses, following the guidelines in the survey methodology literature to deal with CMB.
First, we have used a series of procedural remedies in the early stage of questionnaire design that are ex-ante,
seeking to prevent the emergence of CMB by increasing the respondent's willingness to answer questions and pro-
vide noninfluenced responses (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Rodríguez-Ardura & Meseguer-Artola, 2020, p. I). One of the
procedural remedies we used to reduce the risk of CMB, is guaranteeing the respondents' answers to be anonymous,
which helps diminishing respondents' urge to provide socially desirable answers (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 888;
Rodríguez-Ardura & Meseguer-Artola, 2020, p. II). Other procedural remedies we used are separating between mea-
sures (e.g., between the dependent variable and the independent variables) in the survey; using different question-
naire and scale formats, and defining complex or unfamiliar concepts with examples (Podsakoff et al., 2003;
Rodríguez-Ardura & Meseguer-Artola, 2020, p. II). Furthermore, we carefully constructed the items, by pretesting
the survey among researchers and practitioners, which helps in reducing item ambiguity (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
Moreover, for most variables (including the dependent variable), we used multiple items in our measurement, which
reduces the likelihood of CMB (cf. George & Pandey, 2017).
Furthermore, after data collection, we have screened all data intensively (for some of the countries with help of
native speaking colleagues) by controlling for instance for unreliable data, such as data containing the same score for
most of the questions and/or data in most open ended questions that reflect unreliable answers (e.g., answering with
symbols, punctuations, and/or random sets of letters)—we always controlled red flags by checking different parts of
the data instead of just focusing on one specific part, and we discussed the red flags before taking a collective and
well-argued decision to delete those cases.
Finally, during analyses, we found that the scale reliability of all relevant constructs was well above general
thresholds, which also reduces the likelihood of CMB (cf. George & Pandey, 2017). Next, we have used ex-post sta-
tistical controls/techniques to test CMB post-hoc. We conducted the Harman one-factor test in SPSS and the
unmeasured latent method construct in AMOS to assess whether the majority of the variance could be explained by
a single factor (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Results confirmed that CMB did not pose a threat to the study.
Further description of data analysis approach
As described in the methodology, in order to test our hypotheses, we use SEM with Amos, Version 24. SEM has sev-
eral advantages compared to traditional multivariate procedures, including regression analysis (Byrne, 2010: 3–4).
First, SEM allows for modeling multivariate relationships, analyzing all model variables simultaneously. Furthermore,
SEM takes a confirmatory (i.e., hypothesis-testing) rather than an exploratory approach to the data analysis, moving
beyond essentially descriptive outcomes, thereby lending itself well to the analysis of data for inferential purposes
(Byrne, 2010, pp. 3–4). Moreover, by using separate factor loadings for each observed indicator (the actual survey
items), SEM procedures can include both observed and unobserved (i.e., latent) variables in the model (Byrne, 2010,
pp. 3–4). Finally, “whereas traditional multivariate procedures are incapable of either assessing or correcting for mea-
surement error, SEM provides explicit estimates of these error variance parameters,” which enhances the accuracy
of the data analysis (Byrne, 2010, pp. 3–4).
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To carry out the SEM analyses, we followed the two-step modeling approach introduced by Anderson and
Gerbing (1988). Beforehand, EFA – explorative factor analyses –are carried out, with SPSS Version 24, to explore
the factor structure and prepare the variables for the SEM. We also used SPSS for the descriptive analyses in the
manuscript. For the SEM, we first performed a CFA, examining (confirming) the factor structure of all research vari-
ables in the measurement model and testing the resulting model's fit. Second, we created the structural model to test
the proposed relationships between the constructs.
We modified the measurement model when necessary. One modification to enhance the model included correla-
tions of errors (note that we performed within factor error correlations for two variables: government support [items
1 and 2, 1 and 3, 2 and 3, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, and 5 and 9], and democratic legitimacy [items 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and
6]), which can be used for instance, if correlated errors arise from items that are very similarly worded. This seems to
be an important reason in our research.
Description of reliability and validity measures
As described in the methodology, we used measures to test reliability, convergent and discriminant validity of the
constructs. Below, we will explain these measures in more detail based on and quoting the work of Hair
et al. (2014).
Reliability refers here to the internal consistency of the variable, assessing the degree of consistency between
multiple measurements (the survey items) of a variable, that is, a measure of the degree to which a set of indica-
tors of a latent construct is internally consistent based on how highly interrelated the indicators are with each
other (Hair et al., 2014). To assess internal consistency, we have looked at the reliability coefficient with
Cronbach's alpha, which assesses the consistency of the scale (Hair et al., 2014). The generally agreed upon cut-
off value is 0.70 (Hair et al., 2014). We also looked at the composite reliability, which has the same cut-off point,
and is also a reliability measure to test the internal consistency of a scale, but one that is derived from CFA (Hair
et al., 2014).
For validity, which is about the extent to which a scale or set of measures accurately represents the concept of
interest, we measured convergent and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2014).
For convergent validity, the items that are indicators of a specific variable should converge or share a high pro-
portion of variance in common (Hair et al., 2014). One way to consider convergent validity is by the size of the factor
loadings (here we use the standardized factor loadings, that is, the standardized regression coefficients, showing the
relationships between the survey items and the latent construct). The standardized factor loadings should be statisti-
cally significant and should be 0.5 or higher, and ideally 0.7 or higher. Significant and high loadings on a factor would
indicate that they converge on a common point, the latent structure (Hair et al., 2014).
A second way to demonstrate convergent validity is with the AVE, the average amount of variance in
observed variables (the survey items) that a latent variable is able to explain. With CFA, the AVE is calculated as
the mean variance extracted for the items loading on a construct and is a summary indicator of convergence (Hair
et al., 2014). An AVE of 0.5 or higher suggests adequate convergence for the specific latent construct (Hair
et al., 2014).
The discriminant validity is the extent to which a construct is truly distinctive from other constructs. A high discrimi-
nant validity indicates that a construct is unique and captures some phenomena other measures do not (Hair et al., 2014).
A rigorous test for assessing the discriminant validity for any two constructs, is by comparing the AVE of each
construct with the shared variance (the square of the correlation estimate, the amount of variance in observed vari-
ables (the survey items) relating to a construct (A) that another latent construct (B) is able to explain) between these
two constructs. The AVE should be greater than the squared correlation estimate to provide good evidence of dis-
criminant validity, because, then, a latent construct is able to explain more of the variance in its item measures that it
shares with another construct (Hair et al., 2014).
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APPENDIX B.: RESULTS OF STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENCE TESTS
As explained in the methodology, we performed a structural equivalence test to examine whether the significant struc-
tural model is equivalent across the countries in the sample. We carried out this test through a multiple-group analysis
in Amos, Version 24 (cf. Byrne, 2010). This is a chi-square difference test examining whether the unconstrained model
significantly differs from the constrained model in which the relationships are constrained to be equal across countries
(i.e., the unconstrained model is tested against structural weights). This test imposes the null hypothesis that the struc-
tural model is equivalent across countries. As Amos only enables pairwise comparisons, we repeated the analysis until
all countries were compared to each other. Based on the outcomes, as shown in Table B1, the null hypothesis is
rejected for all pairs of countries; the significant structural model is not invariant across the countries. To test which
relationships in the structural model, differ across the countries, we tested the model for each country separately (see
the results for each country in Table B2) and compared the results to the model in Figure 2.
TABLE B1 Results of multiple-group analyses testing structural equivalence of SEM for each pair of countries
NL UK FR DE SE US










































SE — — — — — Δχ2 = 247.21
Δdf = 54
p = 0.00
Note: Results are shown for the structural weights in the model assuming model unconstrained to be correct. Results of the
multiple-group analysis/chi-square test: Δχ2 = the difference in the Chi-Square values of the models unconstrained and
structural weights; Δdf = the difference in the degrees of freedom of the models unconstrained and structural weights;
p = the probability value of the multiple-group analysis/chi-square test, showing that all p values of all pairs of countries are
statistically significant, meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected—that is, the significant model in Figure 2 is not equal
across countries.
Abbreviations: DE, Germany; FR, France; NL, the Netherlands; SE, Sweden; SEM, structural equation modeling; UK, the
United Kingdom; US, the United States.
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TABLE B2 Results for structural equation modeling (SEM) tests for each country separately
The Netherlands





DL GS 0.06 NS
OS GS 0.02 NS
HA GS −0.07*
RA GS −0.09**










DL GS 0.01 NS
OS GS 0.00 NS
HA GS 0.18***
RA GS −0.02 NS
SEUW GS −0.01 NS
CISS GS −0.04 NS
CISPS GS 0.15**
CISI GS −0.04 NS
France






OS GS −0.04 NS
HA GS 0.06 NS
RA GS −0.03 NS
SEUW GS −0.03 NS
CISS GS −0.04 NS
(Continues)
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TABLE B2 (Continued)
France
Predictor Outcome Std. beta and significance
CISPS GS 0.17***
CISI GS −0.08 NS
Germany









SEUW GS 0.01 NS
CISS GS 0.05 NS
CISPS GS 0.00 NS
CISI GS 0.02 NS
Sweden





DL GS 0.12 NS
OS GS −0.06 NS
HA GS 0.07 NS
RA GS −0.18**
SEUW GS 0.03 NS
CISS GS −0.01 NS
CISPS GS −0.05 NS
CISI GS −0.12*
United States





DL GS 0.07 NS
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TABLE B2 (Continued)
United States
Predictor Outcome Std. Beta and significance
OS GS −0.02 NS
HA GS 0.05 NS
RA GS −0.01 NS
SEUW GS −0.10 NS
CISS GS 0.04 NS
CISPS GS 0.07 NS
CISI GS −0.01 NS
Note: The reporting of the analyses in this table is based on the Merge SWR tables tool of Gaskin and Lim (2018).
Abbreviations: BSL, boundary spanning leadership; CISI, community initiative sector, infrastructure (control variable); CISPS,
community initiative sector, caring for public spaces and planting greenery (control variable); CISS, community initiative
sector, social cohesion (control variable); DL, democratic legitimacy; FO, formal organization; GS, government support; HA,
hours active (control variable); LSC, linking social capital; NS, not significant; OS, organization size; RA, respondent age
(control variable); SEUW, status of employment, unpaid work outside own household (control variable).
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.
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